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Summary
The aim of the paper consists in pre-
senting the place occupied by Bernard 
Bosanquet’s philosophy in the context of 
the welfare provision debate taking pla-
century in Britain. The main thesis of 
the article is that although often accu-
sed of totalitarian or radically individu-
alist tendencies, which supposedly had 
an effect on his attitude towards euge-
nics, Bosanquet’s treatment of the “so-
cial problem” may be seen as an appli-
cation of moderate liberal principles. To 
on intellectual and political attitudes of 
the time towards eugenics, then passing 
to Bosanquet’s stand in relation to this 
referring to the thesis of the article.
Reading today the history of the euge-
nic movement may induce a feeling of 
confusion and cognitive dissonance, of 
which the main reason is the Janus-
faced character of historical approaches 
to the movement. On the one hand re-
searchers face a determined postwar 
criticism of any suggestions of legitimate 
relation between genetic differences and 
a position occupied by individuals in a 
social hierarchy, or their social behavior. 
But until the outbreak of II WW it is quite 
-
nation of not only eugenic theory, but 
also practice. Instead, one comes across 
a popular belief among European as well 
as American intellectuals and politicians 
in the accuracy of eugenic theses, either 
in their positive (i.e. advocating the mar-
riages of genetically valuable individuals 
and convincing them, by means of public 
education, to have as many descendants 
as possible) or negative (i.e. hindering 
the marriages and sterilizing “worthless” 
elements of the society – recidivists, al-
coholics, prostitutes, or the “feeblemin-
ded”) version.
 The course of events leading to 
the situation, in which eugenics cla-
imed the position of a prevailing social 
and political approach to the social pro-
blems seems to begin with the 1880. 
and the reports on the birthrates of the 
poor (Hasian 1996, p. 113). The following 
public debate concerning the danger 
-
bering “normal” citizens, as well as the 
provide for them with any kind of mate-
rial support, led to formation in 1904 of 
the Royal Commission on the Care and 
the Control of the Feebleminded. The 
effects of the works of the Commission 
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have triggered off further institutionali-
zation of the eugenic debate, which from 
the perspective of contemporary political 
divisions may seem surprising. The re-
ason for this is the fact that most liberals 
condemning eugenics, but either sharing 
the conservative admiration for the ra-
dical eugenic scheme implying inter alia 
compulsory sterilization of the “heredita-
ry paupers”, or advancing more modera-
te eugenics, based on voluntary action. 
Thus some commentators, mostly from 
political right, criticize this particular 
engagement as demystifying liberal hy-
pocrisy (liberals on this view on one the 
hand advocate individual freedom, and 
effectiveness and economy). 
 Eugenics became the subject of 
fundamental agreement across the di-
verse ideological lines between the con-
servatives, socialists, and liberals of that 
time. While the conservative support to 
the idea of controlling birth-rates of in-
dustrial class (the so called “industrial 
residuum”) may seem understandable 
in terms of premises underlying their so-
cial perspective (Dorey 2011, p. 15-18), 
liberal recognition of primacy of political 
and personal freedom and socialist re-
spect for equality should rather result in 
criticism of eugenic postulates. But they 
did not. There are few possible explana-
tions of this paradox. Socialists’ positive 
attitude towards eugenics (either positi-
ve or negative) was due to their doctrinal 
closeness to the idea of improvement of 
social conditions by means of state in-
terference. This applied both to Fabians 
(S. Webb, B. Webb) and Marxists (J. B. 
S. Haldane, K. Pearson) (Paul 1984, p. 
Laski, H. G. Wells, were the most popu-
lar leftists supporting general regula-
tions regarding matters such as repro-
duction and family. Some of them were 
very critical of eugenic movement par 
excellence (e.g. Haldane 1938), since the-
ir goal was classless society, and not eli-
improvement of the living conditions of 
the poor by means of centrally-distribu-
tes imperatives and prohibitions, implied 
in moderate forms of resolving the “social 
problem”, was doctrinally close to all so-
cialists.
 Marouf A. Hasian rightly points 
to the fact that liberal support for eu-
genics, even in a moderate form of in-
dividual and voluntary actions initiated 
mostly by public opinion, and not com-
pulsory sterilization and prohibition of 
genetically undesired marriages, helped 
liberals to realize at least few political 
goals: it enabled simultaneous advocacy 
for interventionism and criticism of tho-
roughgoing income redistribution, it hel-
ped gain a theoretical background for the 
postulated social and economic reforms 
(health insurance, poor laws, child labor 
regulations), it facilitated propagation of 
middle-class morality, and it made pos-
limited franchise (Hasian 1996, p. 115). 
 
liberalism and socialism explains what 
seems today to be at least politically un-
of the time seemed to speak in favor of 
undertaking actions aimed at resolving 
the problem of “hereditary paupers”. The 
period separating outbreak of the se-
cond Boer war from the I World War have 
witnessed real “boost for eugenics and 
20
social imperialism” (MacKenzie 1976, 
p. 517-518). During that time eugenics 
-
digm to deal with social problems. Works 
by Charles Booth, H. Llewellyn Smith, 
or Alfred Marshall, arguing for biologi-
cal origins of poverty, have been backed 
with persuasive and exhaustive empi-
rical data (see Richardson 2003, p. 64-
65). It was then that Winston Churchill 
was the vice-president of International 
Eugenics Congress in London (1912), 
and that Eugenics Society managed 
Thus liberal and socialist readiness to 
support eugenic agenda may be said to 
result not from willingness to discrimi-
nate particular groups, but rather from 
on empirical data (Freeden 1978, p. 
178). The radical opposition to any in-
terference with individual freedom, per-
Wedgwood, was perceived even in liberal 
ranks as blindly doctrinal, irrational (be-
-
mon good for present personal interests) 
(Hasian 1996, p. 119).
 Doctrinally distant from liberal 
mainstream were thinkers and reformers 
gathered around Charity Organization 
Society, a leading relief organization in 
London. COS have been under philoso-
phical attack since 1880., when the de-
bate over the possible scope of state in-
tervention in private lives of lower classes 
has originated. Its doctrinal insistence 
on individual self-reliance, self-help, on 
priority of molding character (“in social 
reform character is the condition of con-
ditions”, as John Atkinson Hobson sum-
marized this stand) (cit. after Vincent & 
R. Plant 1984, p. 102) before helping out 
from positive eugenics placed it in oppo-
sition to main political actors (although 
despite its insistence on voluntary ac-
tion, COS has played a role of a personal 
base for Eugenics Society)1. 
 Similar moderate liberal appro-
ach to eugenics had been represented 
Although they agreed neither with volun-
tarism of COS, nor with thoroughgoing 
interventionism, their postulates combi-
ned the essences of both by stating that 
what matters is both character and exter-
-
ping it. Leonard Trelavny Hobhouse, the 
main representative of New Liberalism, 
has been known inter alia for his criti-
cism of eugenic scheme in the name of 
individual liberty and equality of oppor-
tunity (Freeden 1978, p. 189-190).
Laissez-faireism vs. Socialism – Distorted 
Alternative 
Bernard Bosanquet, one of the main 
representatives of the British idealist 
tradition and a disciple of Thomas Hill 
Green, has been an object of philoso-
phical and political attack from surpri-
singly divergent positions. Firstly, as an 
advocate of COS politics of particularism 
and individual charity (resulting e.g. in 
opposition to free school meals), with its 
insistence on self-reliance, he has been 
viewed e.g. by Fabians as radical liberal 
individualist, not appreciating the po-
sitive role played by the state in citizens’ 
life. Secondly, although Bosanquet is 
1  On relation between COS and Eugenics Society 
see Mazumdar 1992, chapter 1.
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considered to be both a New Liberal, and 
an intellectual spiritus movens of COS2, 
he has often been accused of illiberal or 
even totalitarian inclinations. The criti-
cism of his The Philosophical Theory of 
the State by Hobhouse (Hobhouse 1918) 
has resulted in a widespread conviction 
of strictly Hegelian (i.e. antidemocratic 
and “Prussian”) character of his politi-
cal philosophy3. Some scholars even ar-
gue that Bosanquet advocated eugenics, 
which “provided [him] with a modern fra-
mework within which to integrate parts 
of Plato’s theory that were seriously at 
odds with Green’s essentially liberal 
conception of (…) value of individuality” 
(Morrow 1984, p. 104, cf. Morrow 1985, 
p. 511-512). There is no doubt that some 
of Bosanquet’s opinions suggest correct-
ness of such interpretation. His open 
criticism to panmixia, i.e. “genetic lais-
sez-faireism” where each of a kind may 
have progeny with one another, referen-
ces made to the so called Jukes’ family 
as a source of unnecessary burden to the 
state and society (Bosanquet 1895a, p. 
303), statements that an unrestricted re-
will inevitably make “society deteriora-
te” (Bosanquet 1895a, p. 297) (changing 
it into “human inferno” with persons 
“without human qualities”) (Bosanquet 
1895a, p. 291), and the advocacy of 
the „seclusion of the hopeless inebria-
te and the feeble-minded girl-pauper” 
(Bosanquet 1895a, p. 304), seem to make 
such criticism legitimate.
2  On Bosanquet’s involvement in COS see den 
Otter 2007.
3  Many authors have undermined validity of such 
interpretation (see Taylor 1920, Sabine 1923, Broad 
1919, Plamenatz 1968, Sweet 1997, Nicholson 
1990).
 Undoubtedly Bosanquet did en-
gage in the disputes concerning eugenics 
and social selection. In his lectures deli-
vered before London Ethical Society he 
was clearly in favor of introducing poli-
cies protecting society from such “dete-
discussants in the eugenic debate. He 
attacked theoreticians who called them-
selves faithful continuators of Darwin’s 
theory applied to social relations. It was 
mainly Herbert Spencer and his version 
focused on. According to Spencer, orga-
nized charity disturbed the processes of 
natural evolution of mankind, distorting 
also “the average effect” of the laws of 
nature, which is “to ‘purify’ society from 
those who are, in some respect or other, 
essentially faulty”. “He on whom his own 
stupidity, or vice, or idleness, entail loss 
of life, must, in generalizations of philoso-
phy, be classed with the victims of weak 
viscera or malformed limbs. (…) Beings 
thus imperfect are nature’s failures, and 
are recalled by her laws when found to be 
such” (Spencer 1883, p. 415). According 
to Bosanquet, Social Darwinists’ belief 
in the necessity of state’s non-interfe-
rence in the process of natural social 
selection, which is supposed to lead to 
the establishment of societies compri-
sing of the most adjusted individuals, is 
at odds both with Darwin’s theory and 
the actual state of affairs. Spencer’s and 
his followers’ analyses and diagnoses are 
improper due to their mindless equation 
of humans with animals and plants. All 
their faults took beginning in the crucial 
reduction of a complicated human con-
dition to a simple, lower animal existen-
-
tion Spencer could not comprehend that 
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evolution in modern societies means so-
mething very different than the natural 
evolution. It is not a “struggle”, without 
which “the world would still have been 
inhabited only by men of feeble types, 
sheltering in caves and living on wild 
food” (Spencer 1899, p. 241) (even if its 
over the centuries), but social exclusion 
of those unable or unwilling to co-opera-
of society.
 But laissez-faireism in relation 
to state interference and to the problem 
of social selection is as erroneous as the 
opposite, socialist stand. Bosanquet fol-
lowed Benjamin Kidd in differentiating 
between “true Socialism” and “State 
its proposals directly or indirectly lead. 
-
sonal struggle for existence which has 
been waged, not only from the beginning 
of society, but, in one form or another, 
from the beginning of life” (Kidd 1895, p. 
220-221). Kidd has attributed such view 
to Marx, Engels, and Edward Bellamy. 
This was also  the standpoint of Fabians, 
and an ideology implicit in the old Poor 
Law (and to some extent also 1834 Poor 
Law) and Minority Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Law (1909), 
based on the idea of necessity of insti-
tutional help to all willing to receive it 
(Bosanquet 1909; Bosanquet 1895a, p. 
303-304; cf. Vincent 1984). This stand, 
in Bosanquet’s opinion, certainly cannot 
society as a whole. It results in nothing 
but support to those unworthy of it, who 
with material help gain no incentive to 
self-betterment. The second kind of so-
cialism, which Bosanquet found much 
more acceptable, “regulates the compe-
-
ciency of competition” (Bosanquet 1895a, 
p. 291). It uses state’s institutions to cre-
ate most favorable conditions for compe-
tition between individuals, it helps those 
needing only temporary support to signi-
while omitting everyone else.
 The role of inspiration to criticizing 
laissez-faireism and unlimited interven-
tionism was played to Bosanquet by the 
writings of Darwin himself. Bosanquet 
used them to criticize Spencer. In his 
opinion the gulf separating Origins of 
Species from Principles of Ethics is impos-
sible to bridge. Where Darwin saw pro-
gression of species, Spencer saw struggle 
one referred to natural world, the second 
extrapolated this arguments to modern 
societies. This last step is particularly lo-
gically doubtful, since there are far too 
many differences, Bosanquet says, sepa-
rating natural from social condition: „the 
struggle for existence has, in short, beco-
me a struggle for a place in the communi-
ty; and these places are reserved for the 
individuals which in the highest degree 
possess the co-operative qualities de-
manded by circumstances” (Bosanquet 
1895a, p. 294). Natural social selection 
requires not only competition but also 
cooperation, thus consisting not in im-
provement of particular individuals but 
of communities. The loosing community 
is always the one acting not as a who-
le, but as it was comprised of individuals 
striving for personal gains. Furthermore, 
it is not mere survival that is at stake 
in modern societies but rather a strug-
gle for betterment of the conditions of 
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existence. Natural social selection does 
not consist in struggling for life and de-
ath, but in leaving own descendants (as 
Darwin wrote). Today this does not mean 
begetting as much progeny as possible, 
but providing for their safe and sound 
existence. Thus Bosanquet could fair-
ly state his intellectual debt to Thomas 
Henry Huxley, referring particularly to 
his statement that “What is often called 
the struggle for existence in society […] is 
a contest, not for the means of existence, 
but for the means of enjoyment. Those 
-
cal competitive examination are the rich 
or less, occupy the lower places, down to 
the squalid obscurity of the pauper and 
the criminal” (Huxley 1897, p. 40).
 Bosanquet’s own vision of natu-
ral social selection constituted a basis 
for his response both to individualist 
and collectivist thinkers. Contrary to 
individualists, he recognized a neces-
sary role of the state in shaping favora-
ble conditions of societies’ development. 
Unrestricted reproduction of poor, geneti-
cally disadvantaged masses will never re-
sult in promotion of their most valuable 
traits, but will effect in social deteriora-
tion (since welfare usually translates into 
weakened progeny). Yet Bosanquet diffe-
red also from socialists, especially in his 
criticism of general systems of social po-
licy, since “the application of this initia-
tive to guarantee without protest the 
existence of all individuals brought into 
being, instead of leaving the responsibili-
ty to the uttermost possible extent on the 
parents and individuals themselves, is 
an abuse fatal to character and ultima-
tely destructive of social life” (Bosanquet 
1895a, p. 290). Such general approach 
to resolving social dilemmas is unjustly 
said to rest on the authority of science. 
But social reality is too complicated for 
scientists, who will never explain all cau-
ses of human behavior and create infalli-
ble instruments of improving everyone’s 
position. The only legitimate alternative 
is practical and particular testing of „de 
facto will and capacity to give a value in 
the way of social service for which a re-
turn adequate to self-support is received 
from society” (Bosanquet 1967, p. 158). 
This means making support dependent 
on displaying the ability to self-support, 
duties attached to the place occupied in 
social structure.
Ideas Matter
Both strategies – laissez-faireism and 
unrestricted interventionism – fail to 
grasp the conditions of individual de-
velopment due to the overall character 
of their recommendations (Bosanquet 
1895a, p. 301). Only by considering and 
acting with individual cases we can im-
prove lives of people capable of helping 
themselves, either by supporting them 
directly, or by shaking them out of the 
state of pleasant apathy. At least two ar-
guments, in Bosanquet’s opinion, weight 
in favor of this line of thought. Firstly, 
character it is not clear whether they 
are inborn or caused by external circu-
mstances (Bosanquet 1967, p. 143-146). 
The place occupied in a social hierar-
chy, the supposed indicator of individual 
success or failure, and praised by adhe-
rents of laissez-faireism as an infallible 
indicator of “transmittable qualities” 
(Bosanquet 1967, p. 148), should not 
be viewed as such. It is impossible to 
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determine whether such position is the 
result of inherited tendencies/abilities 
or uncontrollable circumstances. Thus 
it is improper to assume that general 
people. Secondly, in case of the general 
welfare systems it is unclear how parti-
cular people would respond to the same 
aid (whether understood as state inter-
ference or non-interference). It is possi-
ble that actions curing some individuals 
(Bosanquet 1895a, p. 149-150).
 Bosanquet’s own attitude to-
-
fare is based on ideas of particularism, 
voluntarism, and idealism. The necessa-
the situation of the poor is reshaping 
their worldviews. Their actual position 
is largely dependent not on themselves, 
but on the system of ideas dominating 
social consciousness – the general will of 
the community (Bosanquet 1895b; see 
Grygienc 2013, chapter 3.2.3). Creating 
a general system of welfare implants 
most people with an idea that “something 
must be done” to prevent them from fa-
ilure to provide for themselves and their 
families (Bosanquet 1895c, p. 112-113). 
It is this attitude that is largely responsi-
ble for the poor condition of the masses. 
And it is this kind of social policy that 
always results in a waste of resources, 
since „You cannot organize what has 
lost the organic character” (Bosanquet 
1895c, p. 109).
 Thus the starting point of every 
effective welfare program should con-
sist in the separation of those willing 
betterment of their position from those 
unready or unable to undertake such 
effort (Bosanquet 1993, p. 297-298). 
Reformatory work should not be fully 
inclusive. If it strives, as it should, at the 
„maintenance of the struggle for existen-
ce in the social sense, or the maintenan-
ce of natural selection in the social sense 
of that term” (Bosanquet 1967, p. 154), 
it has to exclude all individuals inca-
pable of betterment. When this separa-
tion of “what has lost the organic cha-
racter” is completed, the social welfare 
may proceed with aiding condition of the 
poor. Since a character is in large part 
a result of both material and ideological 
(i.e. the general will of community) cir-
cumstances, the social reformer has to 
undertake twofold effort: educatory and 
-
ans (“public assistance, public opinion, 
education of the public mind”) he has 
to change people’s characters and their 
living conditions. Both these elements 
are interconnected by ties of mutual 
conditioning. Development of character 
requires material stability, and econo-
mic welfare usually results from indivi-
dual self-reliance. The only „true analo-
gue of social selection in human society” 
(Bosanquet 1967, p. 299) must comprise 
of two elements: moral and material re-
sponsibility of family, and interference of 
society and state institutions. Thus eve-
ry reformer inevitably faces a question: 
what to begin with – character or con-
ditions? Bosanquet chose the second 
option (Bosanquet 1895c, p. 110-111), 
which comes down to a systematic im-
full-time paid employment (Bosanquet 




Advocates of both critical approaches (“li-
beral” and “totalitarian”) to Bosanquet’s 
vision of effective poor relief and natural 
social selection seem to be mistaken, sin-
ce his philosophy in this respect can be 
described neither as illiberal nor radical-
ly liberal.
 Firstly, although Bosanquet did 
engage in the debates on the social pro-
blem and favorable conditions of natural 
social selection, his propositions regar-
ding these matters seem rather cautio-
us and moderate even to a contempora-
to call them illiberal. Bosanquet did not 
advocate laws forbidding “undesirable” 
marriages, nor any other form of institu-
tionalized compulsion regarding matters 
of social selection. In his opinion the only 
acceptable action must consist in modi-
-
stricting personal freedom (Bosanquet 
1967, p. 152). The only way to introdu-
ce a lasting change of living conditions 
of the poor is to transform their attitude 
from mental dependency upon charity 
This may be achieved only by changing 
the general will of society, which in turn 
can be realized by transformation of pu-
blic opinion through institutionalized 
change of means of support provision. 
Thus authors ascribing to Bosanquet a 
“Hegelian” tendency to put the state abo-
ve individuals (whose personal interests 
are almost of no value), which results in 
his alleged approval of eugenic methods 
of eliminating “worthless” elements of 
society, oversimplify Bosanquet’s stand. 
From the perspective of opinions preva-
iling in the beginning of the XXth century 
in Britain, Bosanquet’s approach to the 
problem of “hereditary paupers” and its 
possible solutions, may be said to be mo-
derate and liberal. 
 Similar inaccuracy may be ascri-
bed to theses of radically liberal cha-
racter of Bosanquet’s vision of social 
policy. Although undoubtedly he advo-
vide 
his opposition to Minority Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law), he 
nonetheless discerned necessity of un-
dertaking institutionalized actions sup-
porting the poor (cf. den Otter 2007, p. 
43-44). Some people would never attain 
material independence (even if they are 
temporary state support or charity. 
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